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1 Introduction 
 
For the modern reader, it is quite an eye-opener to go back and read Gordon Tullock’s paper 
“The welfare costs of tariffs, monopolies, and theft” published in 1967 in the Western 
Economic Journal (now Economic Inquiry). The paper is very short and to the point, uses a 
few simple diagrams, and does not exhibit a single equation or a statistical table of any kind. 
Yet, it contains one of the most powerful new insights emerging from 20th century economic 
thought, laid out clearly towards the end of the paper. The insight, of course, is that the social 
cost of government policy (monopoly, transfers, regulation, etc.) is much greater than 
suggested by the calculation of Harberger triangles and deadweight cost. The source of the 
extra cost is the contesting of rents created by the policies by potential beneficiaries expending 
real resources. This, along with Tullock’s (1980) paper on “Efficient rent seeking” started a 
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huge literature on rent seeking – the term coined by Anne Krueger (1974) for the activities 
described by Tullock.3 
The purpose of this paper is to discuss the influence of the rent-seeking literature on the study 
of the economics of corruption. The terms “rent seeking” and “corruption” are often used 
interchangeably. Closer inspection of the academic literature, however, reveals that the two 
literatures have proceeded in parallel to a surprisingly large extent. I shall argue that this is 
unhelpful and that both the rent-seeking and the corruption literature can benefit from each 
other. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a taxonomy that helps set the 
stage for the rest of the analysis. Section 3 provides a brief overview of the theoretical 
corruption literature. Section 4 evaluates the influence of the rent-seeking literature on the 
study of corruption. Section 5 inquiries into the influence of the corruption literature on the 
study of rent seeking. Section 6 engages with the relationship between empirical research on 
corruption and rent seeking. Section 7 provides some concluding remarks. 
 
2 The core concepts, definitions and taxonomy 
  
In this section, I briefly review the two main insights from Tullock (1967) and propose a 
general taxonomy that can help clarify the link between corruption and rent seeking. 
2.1 The core ideas of the rent-seeking literature 
It is useful, I think, to start by clarifying the main ideas and concepts, even if they are familiar 
to most readers. The rent-seeking literature embodies two core ideas, which can both be found 
in Tullock (1967). The insights are: 
1) The missiles seek heat hypothesis: A contestable rent induces rent-seeking activities 
aimed at capturing the rent. These activities involve unproductive use of real resources 
and cause a social loss. 
                                                 
3The rent-seeking literature has been surveyed by Nitzan (1994), Tollison (1997), Congleton et al. (2008), Hillman 
(2013), and Long (2013 [2015]). The papers in Congleton and Hillman (2015) summarize the different dimensions 
of the rent-seeking literature. 
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2) The invertability hypothesis: Rent-seeking costs are, by and large, unobserved but by 
applying contest theory and assumptions about the behaviour of rent seekers, the size 
of the social cost can be inferred from the value of the contestable rent.  
Examples of contestable rents are abundant: assigning monopoly rights, protectionist trade 
policies, privileged budget allocations, income transfers, national resource rights, and so on. 
The distinguishing feature making a rent contestable is that ex ante – i.e., before it is assigned 
to any particular economic agent – it is up for grabs. This is what makes it rational for potential 
beneficiaries to expend resources in contesting rents.   
Contestable rents differ from contestable profits, which trigger socially productive activities 
(Buchanan, 1980). Contestable profits play an important and efficiency enhancing role in the 
allocation of resources in a capitalist market economy. Economic agents have an incentive to 
expand into markets with profits and to innovate to create profits; this improves resource 
allocation, expands output of the economy and increases aggregate welfare.  
Many contestable rents are created and protected by government policy and government 
officials and politicians are gatekeepers who regulate who gains access to the rents. This is 
what Tullock had in mind. In this case, economic agents cannot contest the rent by shifting 
resources directly into production of the underlying good or service. Instead, they are motivated 
to invest time, effort and other real resources – to engage in rent-seeking activities – in attempts 
to secure either the initial assignment of the right to the rent or in ousting others from their 
position of privilege.  These resources are employed unproductively but have social value in 
alternative employment.  
All this is largely unobserved and certainly not recorded by any statistical agency and reported 
to the public. This makes it hard to know how large these loses really are. Fortunately, the 
second insight – the invertability hypothesis – can help: the social loss can be inferred through 
contest-models from the size of the contestable rent. It is, in other words, possible to “invert” 
the process and use the size of the observable rents to infer the unobserved social cost of rent 
seeking. A very extensive literature on rent dissipation, including Tullock’s (1980) paper on 
efficient rent seeking, has subsequently demonstrated that the possible relations between the 
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observable rent to the underlying rent-seeking expense are complex and contingent on many 
assumptions or influences.4  
2.2 Definitions and taxonomy 
In order to examine the influence that the two core insights from the rent-seeking literature 
have had on the corruption literature, the starting point must be to settle on definitions of what 
the two social phenomena are and to develop a workable taxonomy that can help us organize 
the material.  
The standard definition of “rent seeking” is the quest for privileged benefits from government 
(see, for example, Hillman (2013)). While there is general agreement on this definition, it has 
proved much harder to converge on a widely accepted definition of corruption.5 An often used 
definition of corruption amongst economists is “sale by government officials of government 
property for private gain” (Shleifer and Vishny, 1993) or situations where “the power of public 
office is used for personal gain in a manner that contravenes the rules of the game” (Jain, 2001).  
Taking these definitions at face value, it is clearly possible to have rent seeking without 
corruption and vice versa. If, for example, a government official is charged with allocating 
mobile phone licenses and the rules specify that he must select the company that makes the 
“most convincing case for efficient service delivery” and if he follows this rule to the best of 
his ability, then there is no corruption. Yet, there will be a lot of rent seeking. The mobile phone 
companies will expend vast resources on making their case for being the best for the job. 
Conversely, it is also possible to have corruption without rent seeking. Suppose, for example, 
that one of the companies pays a bribe to obtain the license without any checks on its ability to 
deliver the services efficiently (and no one else makes any effort to show their fitness for the 
job), then we clearly have a situation of corruption but without any real resources have been 
used unproductively in rent-seeking activities. This line of reasoning, however, gives the 
impression that corruption and rent seeking are entirely different social phenomena and that is 
misleading and unhelpful. The problem is that the definition of corruption used in the 
economics literature is too narrow.  
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Hillman and Samet (1987) on all-pay auctions, Ursprung (1990) on rents as public goods, and Aidt 
and Hillman (2008) on rents that endure over time and may require re-contesting. 
5 Williams (2000, vol. 1.) contains a collection of social science articles that dwell more deeply into the definitional 
issues.  
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It is more fruitful, as suggested by Lambsdorff (2002, p. 98), to employ a broader definition. 
Thus, let me define corruption as a special means by which private agents may seek to pursue 
their interest in competition for preferential treatment by government officials or politicians 
and where the “means” are valued by the recipient. The primary example of a “special means” 
is a bribe – a monetary payment in return for preferential treatment. The use of personal 
contacts (favouritism) according to the principle “you help me and I will help you” is another 
example.  
This definition alongside the definition of rent seeking itself highlights an important 
consideration. It matters a lot from a social point of view, if the “means” of seeking preferential 
treatment involves the outputs or income from the production process or it involves the direct 
use of factors of production. In the first case, the available factors of production are employed 
to produce output and generate income to the factor owners, i.e., the economy is on the 
production frontier (maybe on a second best frontier, but nonetheless on the frontier). Some of 
the income thus generated may be used to seek rents and preferential treatment. This is the 
situation envisaged by much of the corruption literature. In the second case, factors of 
production, for example, labour, which could have been employed in production of output are 
deployed in the process of seeking rents – people who could become entrepreneurs become 
lobbyists. As a consequence, the economy produces below its production frontier and output 
and income is lost. This is the situation envisaged by the rent-seeking literature which is 
concerned with the efficiency losses due to unproductive use of resources in the quest for rents. 
Using the definitions, corruption and rent seeking can be combined as instances of influence-
seeking activities. Such activities can be distinguished along two dimensions: whether the 
gatekeeper who assigns the rent benefits from the influence-seeking activities and whether the 
influence-seeking activity involves a transfer of income (bribe) or unproductive use of 
resources. This gives rise to the two-by-two taxonomy in Table 1a and the illustrative examples 
in Table 1b.  
Table 1a: General taxonomy of influence-seeking activities. 
Means/Gains Gatekeeper does not gain Gatekeeper gains 
Income transfer Impure corruption Pure corruption 
Factor of production Pure rent seeking Impure rent seeking 
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Table 1b: Taxonomy of influence-seeking activities: Examples. 
Means/Gains Gatekeeper does not gain Gatekeeper gains 
Income transfers Bribes with transaction costs  
Tirole (1992) 
Bribes with no transaction 
costs  
Rose-Ackerman (1975) 
Factor of production Advocacy, argumentation 
Tullock (1967) 
Contestable bribery  
Gradstein and Konrad 
(1999) 
 
According to this taxonomy, pure corruption refers to the case where competition for 
preferential treatment is such that the gatekeeper benefits from the influence-seeking 
expenses/activities in the way of a costless income transfer from the beneficiary to the 
gatekeeper. Pure rent seeking refers to the situation in which competition for preferential 
treatment is such that the gatekeeper does not benefit from the influence-seeking 
expenses/activities, which represent unproductive use of factors of production. The case of 
impure corruption emerges if the income transfer is associated with a transaction cost such that 
the value of the income transfer to the gatekeeper is lower than the cost to those paying the 
transfer. Impure rent seeking emerges if the unproductive use of factors of production in 
seeking influence may, in fact, benefit the gatekeeper. 
There are, of course, a whole raft of intermediate cases and many other distinctions can be 
made (corruption is restricted to a few competitors while rent seeking is open to all; corruption 
is not legal, while rent seeking is, etc.), but the two-dimensional taxonomy is, at the very least, 
helpful in clarifying the link between the rent-seeking and corruption literature. Most of the 
corruption literature is concerned with situations where the gatekeeper gains and the influence-
seeking activity represents an income transfer. Bribery is the classical example of this which is 
often viewed as a costless transfer (e.g., Rose-Ackerman, 1975; Lui, 1985). In reality, even 
bribery is associated with transaction costs (e.g., Tirole, 1992). This reduces the value of the 
bribe for the gatekeeper and in the limit, makes it worthless. The classical rent-seeking 
literature, including the examples given by Tullock (1967) and the analysis in Hillman and 
Samet (1987) and many other papers on rent dissipation is about pure rent seeking: real 
resources are being employed in seeking, say, a government-sponsored monopoly rent, which 
is assigned without any gain to the official who assigns it. However, it is possible to envisage 
cases in which the gatekeeper may gain. The literature on contest design, for example, engages 
with the possibility that the rent-seeking expense is, in fact, valued by the government official 
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who assigns the underlying rent (Gradstein and Konrad, 1999; Epstein and Nitzan, 2015). This 
leads to what I call contestable bribery in Table 1b. 
3 Overview of the corruption literature 
 
The theoretical corruption literature has evolved along two main branches.6 They are  
1. The helping hand type of corruption: Corruption arises when a benevolent principal 
delegates decision making power to a non-benevolent agent. The level of corruption 
depends on the costs and benefits of designing optimal institutions. Corruption is 
optimal. 
2. The grabbing hand type of corruption: Corruption arises because non-benevolent 
government officials introduce inefficient policies in order to extract rents from the 
private sector. The level of corruption depends on the incentives embodied in existing 
(often suboptimal) institutions and policies. Corruption is not optimal. 
The first branch of literature has its origin in the law and economics and in the organisational 
economics literatures, with classical contributions by Becker and Stigler (1974), Rose-
Ackerman (1975), and Tirole (1992, 1994) and, more recent contributions, by Laffont and 
Guessan (1999), Acemoglu and Verdier (2000), Dabla-Norris (2002), and Dhami and Al-
Nowaihi (2007) amongst many others. A typical “helping hand” scenario, which we shall use 
as a heuristic devise below, is environmental regulation. Un-internalised and socially harmful 
externalities provide a prima facie case for government intervention and a benevolent 
government would want to impose a correction. In practice, the task of doing so is delegated 
to a bureaucracy. The officials of the bureaucracy will amongst other things be tasked with 
checking that the polluting firms abide by the regulations. The problem, however, is that it is 
impossible for the government to monitor the officials perfectly. This leaves room for collusion 
between the firms and the officials. Any given official may agree to accept a bribe for not 
reporting violations of the regulations. Or the regulator may simply come to identify with the 
regulated firm. The benevolent government tries to avoid this by designing institutions 
(monitoring, wage structures, penalties) to maximise social welfare, but it is costly to design 
                                                 
6 Aidt (2003) lists two additional categories, called efficient corruption and self-reinforcing corruption. For the 
purpose of evaluating the influence of the rent-seeking literature on the corruption literature, it is, however, 
sufficient to zoom in on the two main categories listed in the text. For other classifications, see Tanzi (1998), 
Rose-Ackerman (1999) or Jain (2001). 
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such institutions. It may, therefore, be optimal to accept a residual of corruption and rule 
violation. That is, corruption within this conception is, in fact, optimal in a second best sense. 
The second strand of literature starts from the Tullock dictum “people are people” and does not 
assume any degree of benevolence in the conduct of the government. Examples of 
contributions to this literature include Shleifer and Vishny (1993), Bliss and di Tella (1997), 
and Aidt and Dutta (2008). A typical “grabbing hand” scenario, which we shall also explore 
below, is entry regulation. Suppose that there are no good welfare economics reasons for 
restricting entry into an industry. Yet, a corruptible government official or politician may 
nonetheless introduce a license system that restricts entry. The reason is that such regulation 
creates rents through artificial scarcity. As a consequence, potential producers in the industry 
is willing to pay a bribe to obtain a license. A leviathan-type politician would, then, issue the 
bribe maximising number of licences and collect the largest possible bribe income. In practice, 
however, institutional constraints may impose some limits of this sort of behaviour. The level 
of corruption depends on given institutional structures, culture, and history and is, in general, 
sub-optimal. Moreover, the type of corruption is endogenous to the political regime. Charap 
and Harm (2002) point out that this is a natural consequence of the predatory strategies that 
“rulers” operating under different constraints employ to extract rents from the economy. For 
example, in a dictatorship, a corrupt and low-paid bureaucracy, either of the competitive or 
monopolistic type, can at the same time help the dictator to maintain power and to extract rents 
from the economy. In contrast, in a functioning democracy, the preferred vehicle for rent 
extraction becomes interest group contributions to political campaigns.  
 
4 The influence of the rent-seeking literature on the study of corruption 
 
We can use the two examples developed above to evaluate the influence of the rent-seeking 
literature on the study of the economics of corruption. In the “helping hand” scenario, a 
corruptible public official may share a rent with the firm that he is meant to regulate by 
accepting a bribe in return for turning a blind eye to environmental violations. The rent itself 
is created by asymmetric information and imperfect monitoring. There is a social loss involved 
because of socially undesirable environmental damage. This is, however, optimal given the 
costs and benefits of designing incentives. It is important for this conclusion that the 
information rent is not contestable and the influence-seeking activity – offering a bribe – is a 
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pure transfer. It is also important that the bribe does not by itself involve a social loss, although 
one could imagine that transaction costs would reduce the value of the bribe received below 
the utility cost of paying it. Yet, the point remains that the receiver, the government official, 
values the bribe. In this type of model, influence seeking is limited to what I termed pure (or at 
worst impure) corruption in Table 1a. It is simply a transfer of resources from one set of agents 
to another. There is no social loss involved over and above the fact that public policy is 
distorted. 
In the grabbing hand scenario, rents have to be created by the public official before bribes can 
be collected. This is done by introducing a license system which restricts entry to economic 
activity and creates artificial scarcity. This, by itself, involve a social loss. Yet, the public 
official has a private incentive to do this because he can extract some or all of the rent from the 
would-be producers who are willing to offer a bribe to be “assigned” the scarcity rent. Again, 
the bribe is a pure transfer between producers and public officials, and, given and take, 
transaction costs, it does not constitute a social loss in and by itself. Although the rent created 
by each licence is contestable, the structure of the contest is such that competition takes place 
through bribery. It does not involve any persuasion, advocacy or any other activity which 
would involve “burning” real resources with positive shadow prices and which might not 
benefit the public official personally in the process of seeking the rent conferred by the 
production licence.  
The core insight from Tullock’s seminal paper that these approaches (and the corruption 
literature more generally) have not taken up is the notion of “rent contestability”. Consider the 
case of monopoly rents created by entry restrictions. Tullock (1967) points out that, if the 
monopoly rent is contestable, it will attract real resources, which he assumed was equal to its 
value. This adds the “Tullock rectangle” to the standard deadweight cost of monopoly. If, in 
contrast, the monopoly right were secured by paying the public official in charge a bribe, it 
would appear that the additional cost would vanish: the bribe is “just” a transfers from one 
party to another. However, this misses the point. Posner (1975) puts it like this: “It might seem 
that where monopoly is obtained by bribery of government officials, the additional loss of 
monopoly [the rent-seeking cost] would be eliminated since a bribe is a pure transfer. In fact, 
however, bribery merely shifts the monopoly profit to the officials receiving the bribe and 
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draws real resources into the activity of becoming the official who is in the position to receive 
these bribes” (p. 82).7 
This is a very important point which has been largely ignored in the corruption literature, but 
not entirely. Hillman and Katz (1987) take up the baton in their paper “Hierarchical structure 
and the social costs of bribes and transfers”.8 Their starting point is that agents who seek a rent 
may use bribery – transfers of income – to gain access to the rent. While these bribes do not 
(necessarily) involve any social loss, the bribe income stream may be contestable. This happens 
when bribe income is a prize that can be won through a contest for particular positions in 
government, i.e., the positions to which the bribes accrue are themselves contestable. In the 
environmental regulation scenario, for example, being appointed to oversee regulated firms 
may be open to many potential officials who all know that obtaining the appointment will allow 
them to extract bribes from the firms that they oversee. If so, a pure rent-seeking contest will 
follow and the resources employed in winning that contest may well be time and effort – factors 
of production that could be used productively. Consequently, the rent created by the corruption 
opportunity offered by asymmetric information and imperfect monitoring, not only represents 
a case of pure corruption. It also represents a case of pure rent seeking because the position in 
the government bureaucracy is a contestable rent. The situation becomes even worse when 
influence seeking takes place within a hierarchy in which lower-down officials pass some of 
the bribe income on to higher-up officials. In this case, each position becomes a contestable 
rent with an associated social cost of contestability (Hillman and Katz, 1987). Another reason 
why the rent-seeking cost is likely to be large in this case is that the rents are private, i.e., the 
prize of obtaining a position in the hierarchy is a private revenue stream. Ursprung (1990) has 
shown that the distinction between private and public-goods rents is very important for the 
overall social cost. The degree of rent dissipation is much larger with private than with public-
goods rents.     
The point about contestability is also taken up in a sequence of studies of misallocation of talent 
and corruption, although the connection to the rent-seeking literature is not always made 
explicit. The general idea in this literature is that talented people can be employed as private 
sector entrepreneurs (or in some other productive job) or as government bureaucrats. Positions 
in the public sector offer corruption possibilities and government officials can benefit 
                                                 
7 Kruger (1974, pp. 292-3) makes a similar point. 
8 Hillman and Ursprung (2000) describe nested contests in which outsiders compete to be insiders who compete 
directly for rents. Political culture determines the openness of the contests to outsiders.  
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personally from the rents they control (created by, for example, collusion allowed by 
asymmetric information as in the example above). Controlling these rents is a contestable prize 
and agents will seek employment in the government sector to gain access to them. If the most 
talented people seek these jobs, there will be misallocation of talent: individuals who should 
have become productive entrepreneurs become rent seekers (in the sense of pure rent seeking) 
instead. The social costs of rent seeking is, then, the economic consequences of this 
misallocation of talent, which could be lower growth or income, plus, of course, the policy 
distortion created by bribery in the first place.  
Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) develop this logic in a model of allocation of talent in 
which the government serves no particular purpose. However, government jobs offer the 
possibility to create and extract rents to the personal benefit of the holder of the job (which is 
their definition of corruption). The analysis emphasizes that talent is often general and talented 
individuals can be successful in many different jobs, including in jobs that offer pure corruption 
possibilities and in entrepreneurial jobs. More able people may be able to extract more rents, 
and if this advantage is sufficiently large, the most talented will seek jobs in the public sector 
because those jobs offer corruption opportunities. The social cost is too little innovation and 
lower economic growth (see also Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1993)). 
The underlying premise of this analysis is that more able people are good at both rent seeking 
and productive activities. This appears plausible: many lobbyists are very clever, and could 
have put their talent to productive use in the biotech or some other frontier industry rather than 
use their abilities in the lobbying industry. However, this is not the only reason why corruption 
opportunities in the public sector can lead to misallocation of talent. Acemoglu and Verdier 
(1998, 2001) point to another more subtle mechanism. In their analysis, the government 
bureaucracy has a socially valuable purpose, namely to enforce contracts that support 
productive investment. This, however, creates corruption possibilities since individual 
bureaucrats may decide not to enforce a contract in return for a payment from the party that 
benefits. Anticipating this makes investment unprofitable ex ante and too little or no investment 
will be undertaken. The benevolent government may try to solve this problem by paying 
efficiency wages. This, however, generates a social cost because it attracts individuals to the 
public sector with no comparative advantage in that sector. The rent-seeking cost is indirect in 
this model: it is not so much the fact that government jobs offer corruption possibilities that is 
the source of the problem. Rather, it is the benevolent government’s attempt to control 
corruption by paying above market wages that induces the misallocation of talent. 
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5 The influence of the corruption literature on the study of rent seeking 
 
While the corruption literature, leaving the exceptions noted above aside, could learn from the 
rent-seeking literature, it is not a one-way street. The rent-seeking literature can also learn from 
the corruption literature, or, at least, part of it.  
Most importantly, the “grabbing hand” corruption literature emphasises rent creation: corrupt 
officials create rents which they extract for themselves via bribery. They do so by introducing 
artificial scarcity via licenses, permissions, cumbersome procedures, etc. In contrast, in the 
rent-seeking literature, the rents are often (but obviously not always) taken as given; they are 
there for “whatever reason”. It is plain that the incentive of a public official to create artificial 
scarcity depends critically on whether he or she can subsequently benefit from the rent thus 
created. Government officials have little incentive to create rents if they cannot benefit from 
them (Hillman 2015). Bribery allows officials the maximum flexibility in capturing the rent 
they have created. As emphasized by Lambsdorff (2002), this makes corruption, understood as 
influence-seeking activities from which officials personally benefit, particularly harmful to 
society: corruption possibilities encourage rent creation. If, instead, rent creation triggers 
influence-seeking activities which do not directly benefit the official and may even be costly 
to him or her because it involves costly engagement with lobbyists and special interests, then 
the incentive to create the rent in the first place is decreased.  
In short, corruption encourages rent creation because it allows the creator of the rent to benefit 
personally. To quote Tullock (1996, p. 8) in his discussion of corruption in 19th century China, 
“the official actually write the laws with the intent of being bribed to permit people to avoid 
carrying out the law.” In contrast, if bribery for some reason becomes impossible or 
unattractive (e.g., because of better control structures) and, as a consequence, most rents will 
be contested in ways that do not benefit the official, then he or she might decide that it is time 
to repeal the regulation that generated the rent in the first place and be deterred from thinking 
up ways to create new rents. An implication, then, is that bribery is particularly harmful from 
a social point of view. It underlies the incentive for officials to create rents. This is socially 
harmful in itself because it involves creating artificial scarcity and this creates deadweight 
losses. On top of that, bribery and corruption more broadly maximise the risk of triggering 
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costly contests related to obtaining the positions in government that enable the bribes to be 
collected. 
While the consequences of the symbiotic relationship between rent creation and corruption has 
yet to be fully explored in the rent-seeking literature in general, the literature on contest design, 
initiated by Gradstein and Konrad (1999) and explored in Mealem and Nitzan (2015) amongst 
others, provides the foundation for a bridge between the two literatures. It studies how a contest 
might be designed if the “rent-seeking effort” is beneficial to the contest designer who then has 
an interest in maximising “effort”. This incentive is particularly strong if the “effort” is a bribe 
transfer to the contest designer. A promising research programme would be to explore more 
deeply the interplay between corruption, rent creation and contest design.  
6 The empirics of corruption and rent seeking 
 
The past 30 years have seen a massive empirical research effort aimed at understanding the 
causes and consequences of (pure) corruption (see, e.g., Paldam, 2002; Lambsdorff, 2005; 
Svensson, 2005; Triesman, 2007; Aidt, 2011a). This research agenda has been fuelled by cross 
country data on corruption perceptions and more recently by individual or firm level survey 
data on experienced corruption. These types of data have attracted a fair amount of critique and 
rightly so.9 Yet, the empirical corruption literature clearly points to substantial economic costs 
of corruption. Mauro (1995), for example, finds a small negative growth effect and a large 
negative effect of corruption on investment. Subsequent research has shown that the growth 
effect interacts with the underlying quality of institutions (Aidt et al., 2008; Méndez and 
Sepúlveda, 2006, Méon and Weill, 2010) and that corruption has a detrimental impact on 
sustainable development (Aidt, 2011b). Other studies have shown that corruption increases 
inequality (Gupta et al., 2002) and distorts fiscal and monetary policy and the composition of 
government spending (e.g., Mauro, 1998; Hessami, 2014; Dimakou, 2015). Expenditure 
tracking studies undertaken in many countries have demonstrated how vast amounts of public 
resources intended for schools and other public spending programmes simply disappear and 
never reach the intended beneficiaries (Reinikka and Svensson, 2004).  
Unlike the study of corruption, empirical research on rent seeking can hardly be said to be 
booming.10 The existing research efforts have partly been guided by the invertability 
                                                 
9 See the critical discussion in Kaufmann et al. (2006). 
10 Del Rosal (2011) offers a critical survey of the empirical rent-seeking literature.  
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hypothesis and partly by attempts to measure rent seeking costs directly. Krueger (1974), 
Posner (1975) and Cowling and Mueller (1978) pioneered the indirect method based on the 
invertability hypothesis. Kruger (1974) estimated that the welfare loss from trade intervention 
in India and Turkey in the 1960s was between 7 and 15 percent of GNP. Posner (1975) 
estimated the rent seeking cost associated with monopoly regulation in the USA to be between 
5 and 32 percent of industry sales. Cowling and Mueller (1978) found that the total welfare 
cost of monopoly in the US and the UK, respectively, was 13 and 7 percent of gross corporate 
product. These studies and others like them assume full rent dissipation. The theoretical 
literature on rent seeking contests shows that this assumption is only valid in special cases and 
that the degree of dissipation depends on the contest function, on risk preferences, on the nature 
of the prize being sought, and on many other features. Employing the full dissipation 
assumption is, therefore, likely to inflate the cost estimates. Lopez and Pagoulatos (1994) is a 
rare example of a study that estimates the degree of rent dissipation. They find, in an application 
to US trade policy, that 67 percent of the value of the available rent is dissipated and estimate 
the total social loss of trade barriers in the US to be 12.5 percent of the value of domestic 
consumption. Hazlett and Michaels (1993) also estimate dissipation ratios. They explore a 
natural experience induced by a cellular telephone licence lottery in the 1980s in the USA and 
find that the ratio was 31.2 percent on average. 
An alternative approach is to estimate the social cost of rent seeking simply by adding 
observable expenditures on rent seeking related activities up. A typical finding is that the actual 
money spent on lobbying (in the USA) is low relative to the value of the rents at stake – an 
observation Tullock (1988) himself made when he rhetorically asked why the total amount of 
resources going into politics appear to be small relative to the value of the prizes that can 
potentially be won.11 Others have gone further than counting lobbying expenses and added 
more expenditures to the rent seeking bill (e.g., expenditures on advertising, on crime 
prevention, or on property rights disputes) or tried to estimate rent seeking costs from “excess” 
presence of certain types of economic activities in capital cities (e.g., sit-down restaurants). 
The estimates emerging from this type of research vary a lot in size, from 0.2 to 23.7 percent 
of GDP (Del Rosal, 2011, Table 2). The fundamental problem with this approach clearly is that 
                                                 
11 Mixon (2002), for example, finds that interest group contributions related to obtaining social security funds in 
the USA amount to only 0.2 percent of the value of the potential rents. Goldberg and Maggi (1999) estimate the 
weight given to social welfare relative to special interest groups in the setting of US trade policy. Their results 
suggest that the influence of special interests is very small, which, again, suggests that the welfare cost of rent 
seeking is of limited importance. Hillman and Ursprung (2016) discuss reasons why there appear to be less rent 
seeking and less rent dissipation than might be expected. 
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it requires an up-front judgement about what constitutes rent seeking costs, and doing that 
objectively is hard, if not impossible.   
The empirical rent-seeking literature suggests that rent dissipation is incomplete, and that the 
total rent seeking cost, therefore, could be a lot smaller than the value of the rents. In contrast, 
the empirical corruption literature points to substantial welfare costs of corruption and strongly 
suggests that corruption is a major obstacle to economic development. Of course, one could 
take the view that corruption costs in practise are correlated with rent seeking costs. However, 
doing so would diverge attention away from the very important task of quantifying the true 
cost of rent seeking. One way out of this conundrum is to base empirical research on rent 
seeking more firmly on rent seeking theory and to build structural models that can be matched 
to observable data on policy outcomes, campaign contributions, employment in the lobbying 
industry, etc. and in that way help us back out the true cost of public policy. 
7 Conclusion 
 
It is surprising that the corruption and rent-seeking literatures have not crisscrossed more than 
it appears to have been the case. After all, they are both concerned with what I have called 
influence-seeking activities and there is clearly scope for fruitful cross fertilization. The 
corruption literature, both the branch that focuses on principal-agent relationships within 
government and the branch that focusses on leviathan-type governments, has largely ignored 
the “missiles seek heat hypothesis” of rent seeking, i.e., the notion that the presence of 
contestable rents elicits socially costly activities aimed at winning the rents. The consequences 
of this are two-fold. First, the literature underestimates the value of corruption- control policies. 
The overriding objective of the law and economics and organisational economics literature on 
corruption is precisely to devise and evaluate such policies. A fruitful research project would 
be integrate the notion of contestable rents and the associated rent-seeking cost into the 
principal-agent models of corruption and to reconsider existing results about socially optimal 
levels of corruption. Second, the literature underestimates the social cost of corruption. Insofar 
as corruption is conceptualized as a costless transfer of income from one party to another, it 
may appear that corruption is a social problem only because it leads to policy distortions and 
because it leads to inequitable and unfair allocations of public resources and funds. The rent-
seeking literature would insist adding Tullock rectangles on the debit side. We just need to 
quantify them. 
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